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INTRODUCTION

Criminal liability of parents who treat their children's illnesses
through spiritual means or prayer alone is the subject of increasing debate. When children die as a result of their parents' religious practices,
prosecutions for crimes such as felony child endangerment, manslaughter, and murder may follow. Most states have codified some type of religious accommodation statute which provides a criminal liability
exemption for parents who engage in spiritual healing or prayer treatment for their sick children instead of seeking traditional medical assistance. The scope, purpose, and language of these statutes, however,
vary." Even when statutes appear to be similar in content, courts have
1. The following are examples of state legislation regarding a statutory exemption from liability for use of spiritual healing- Ala. Code § 13A-13-6(b) (1982), Ala. Code § 26-14-1(2) (1992);
Alaska Stat. § 47.17.020(d) (Supp. 1988); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 8-531.01 (West 1989); Ark. Code
Ann. 12-12-502(3) (1987); Cal. Penal Code § 270 (West 1988), Cal. Penal Code § 11165.2(b) (West
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disagreed on the correct interpretation and applicability of the liability
exemptions. A primary problem facing courts in these cases is how to
interpret the language in the statute and whether two or more statutes
involved in a case should be construed together in defining criminal behavior.2 Moreover, defendants in accommodation statute cases have
forced courts to decide several constitutional issues dealing with the Establishment Clause, the Due Process Clause, the Equal Protection
Clause, and the First Amendment freedom of religion.
While the other concerns implicated by these statutes are significant, this Note will focus on the issues of statutory construction, freedom of religion, and the notice requirement of due process. Part II
discusses the legal background of religion's role in the law. Part III describes two cases, one from California and the other from Florida, that
illustrate the debate over the conviction of parents who rely on similar
prayer exemption provisions as criminal defenses. Part IV analyzes the
reasoning utilized by both courts in reaching their holdings and examines the ramifications of each holding. Part V concludes that religious
accommodation statutes should not protect parents from criminal prosecutions for the death of or serious bodily harm to their children.
1992); Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 16509.1 (West 1991), Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 18950.5 (West
1991); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14-6-101 (West 1989), Colo. Rev. Stat. § 19-3-103 (West 1990); Del.
Code Ann. tit. 16, § 907 (Michie 1983), Del Code Ann. tit. 11, § 1104 (Michie 1987); D.C. Code
Ann. § 2-1356 (Michie 1988); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 415.503(9)(f) (West Supp. 1992); Haw. Rev. Stat. §
350-4 (Michie 1988); Idaho Code § 16-1602(s)(1) (Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1992); Idaho Code §§ 18401(2), 18-1501(3) (Michie 1987); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch.23, para. 2054 (West Supp. 1992); Ind. Code
Ann. § 35-46-1-4(a), -5(c) (Michie 1985); Iowa Code § 232.68(2)(c) (West 1985), § 726.6(1)(d) (West
Supp. 1992); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-3608(1)(c) (1988); Ky. Rev. Stat. § 600.020(1) (Michie 1990); La.
Rev. Stat. § 14:403(b)(5) (West Supp. 1992); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17-A, § 557 (West 1983), Me.
Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 22, § 4010 (West 1992); Md. Fano. Law Code Ann. § 5-701(n)(2) (Michie 1991);
Miss. Code Ann. § 43-21-105(l)(i), (m) (Supp. 1992); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 210.115.3 (West Supp. 1992),
Mo. Ann. Stat. § 568.040.2(4) (West 1979), Mo. Ann. Stat. § 568.050.2 (West Supp. 1992); Nev.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 200.5085 (Michie 1992), § 432B.020(2) (Michie 1991); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 169C:3 XIX(c) (1990), N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 170-C.5 11 (1990), N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 639.3 IV
(1986); N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 32-1-3(L)(5), 32-1-3(M)(4) (Supp. 1992); N.D. Cent. Code § 50-25.105.1(2) (Michie 1989); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, § 852 (West Supp. 1993), Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, §
852.1 (West Supp. 1993); Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 419.500(1) (Butterworth 1987); R.I. Gen. Laws § 4011-15 (Michie 1990); S.C. Code Ann. § 20-7-490(C)(3) (1985); S.D. Codified Laws Ann. § 25-7-16
(1992), S.D. Codified Law Ann. § 25-7-17.1 (1992), S.D. Codified Law Ann. § 26-8A-23 (1992);
Tenn. Code Ann. § 71-6-102(1) (1987), Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-157(c) (1991); Utah Code Ann. §
78-3a-19.5 (Michie 1992); Va. Code Ann. §§ 18.2-314, 18.2-371.1 (Michie 1988), Va. Code Ann. §
63.1-248.2A2 (1991); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 26.44.020(3) (West Supp. 1992); Wis. Stat. Ann. §
48.981(3)(c)(4) (West 1987); Wyo. Stat. § 14-3-202(a)(vii) (1986), Wyo. Stat. § 35-1-201 (1988).
2. Usually, these cases involve an accommodation statute of some sort and another law containing criminal provisions such as child abuse, murder, or manslaughter. Defendants often argue
that an exemption for certain behavior defined in the accommodation statute should be applied to
other crimes.
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LEGAL BACKGROUND

A.

Free Exercise

The First Amendment to the United States Constitution absolutely
protects religious belief.' According to the Supreme Court, however,
states may still regulate religiously motivated conduct.4 Of course, this
does not mean that all state interferences with religious conduct are
constitutional. Rather, the government must have a compelling state interest before it can interfere with the constitutional right to free exercise of religion. 5 Additionally, the state must demonstrate that the
regulation chosen is the least intrusive method of effectively protecting
its interest.8
In Prince v. Massachusetts, for example, the Supreme Court indicated that the protection of children is generally a compelling state interest.7 Therefore, the state may pass a law that infringes on parents'
free exercise of their religious beliefs if such a law protects children. In
Prince, the Supreme Court explored the limits of the free exercise right
and concluded that religious freedom does not include the right to harm
the community or, more specifically, to expose a child to health risks or
3. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
4. "Conduct remains subject to regulation for the protection of society." Id. at 304.
5. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963). In Sherbert, the Supreme Court, quoting
Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945), stated that "'[o]nly the gravest abuses, endangering
paramount interests, give occasion for permissible limitation.'" Id.
But see Employment Div. Dept. Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). In
Smith, the Supreme Court limited the application of the Sherbert analysis in certain situations.
When an "across-the-board criminal prohibition on a particular form of conduct" exists, the state
need not show a compelling interest to defeat a Free Exercise challenge. Id. at 884. In support of
this proposition, the Court quoted Lyng v. Northwestern Indian Cemetery Protective Assn., 485
U.S. 439, 451 (1988): "The government's ability to enforce generally applicable prohibitions of
socially harmful conduct... 'cannot depend on measuring the effects of a governmental action on
a religious objector's spiritual development.'" Id. The Court further noted that "[tlo make an
individual's obligation to obey such a law contingent upon the law's coincidence with his religious
beliefs, except where the State's interest is 'compelling'--permitting him, by virtue of his beliefs,
'to become a law unto himself,' contradicts both constitutional tradition and common sense."
Smith, 494 U.S. at 885 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 167 (1878)).
The Smith case, though not exactly on point because no statutory exemption was at issue,
may be relevant in future accommodation statute cases. Perhaps state courts will interpret Smith
as an indication that the Supreme Court would not view the Free Exercise Clause as a defense to a
generally applicable law such as murder.
6. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 407.
7. 321 U.S. 158, 167-70 (1944). In Prince, the court upheld a child labor law that prohibited,
among other things, children under a certain age from selling magazines in public places. The
mother of two children allowed them to sell a Jehovah's Witnesses' publication in a public place
and claimed that the law prohibiting this behavior contravened her Free Exercise rights. Id. at
169-70.
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death.8 Further, the Prince Court also found that parents have no right
to make their children religious martyrs; rather, the children themselves, when they reach the age of legal maturity, should be the ones to
decide whether to follow in their parents' faith.9
B. Due Process
In order to satisfy the demands of the Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process Clause, states must give their citizens fair notice of what
actions constitute criminal behavior. 10 States have differed in their interpretations of the notice requirement. In California, for example, the
state violates the Due Process Clause if one of its statutes is not definite enough to provide standards of conduct that are proscribed, as well
as standards for police enforcement and the ascertainment of guilt.1 1 In
contrast, Florida's highest court has held that a violation of due process
occurs when a law is so confusing that one cannot discern what is being
proscribed.1 2 In addition, a court might find statutes void for vagueness
if they issue commands that are inexplicably contradictory.13 In such a
case, due process is not satisfied since one cannot comply with both
laws or even understand exactly what is being prohibited.
-III.

THE DEBATE

The state supreme court decisions of California and Florida illustrate the debate over whether parents should be criminally liable for
the deaths of or substantial harm to their children when the parents
rely solely on spiritual healing or prayer for a cure. In Walker v. Superior Court, the California Supreme Court held that a spiritual healing
8. "The right to practice religion freely does not include liberty to expose the community or
the child to communicable disease or the latter to ill health or death." Id. at 166-67 (citing People
v. Pierson, 68 N.E. 243 (1903)).
9. "Parents may be free to become martyrs themselves. But it does not follow that they are
free, in identical circumstances, to make martyrs of their children before they have reached the age
of full and legal discretion when they can make that choice for themselves." Prince, 321 U.S. at
170.
10. See Mourning v. Family Publications Service, Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 375 (1973) (quoting
McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 27 (1931)) (stating that due process should ensure that no
person is convicted "unless 'a fair warning has first been given to the world in language that the
common world will understand, of what the law intends if a certain line is passed' ").
11. Burg v. Municipal Court, 673 P.2d 732, 746 (Cal. 1983). See also Kolender v. Lawson, 461
U.S. 352, 357-58 (1983).
12. The court stated that due process is lacking when "a man of common intelligence cannot
be expected to discern what activity the statute is seeking to proscribe." Linville v. State, 359
So.2d 450, 453-54 (Fla. 1978). See also Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 393
(1926) (stating that a statute lacks due process if it precludes "an ordinary person" from deciding
in advance which courses of conduct are legal).
13. Raley v.Ohio, 360 U.S. 423, 438 (1959).
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exemption, intended to protect parents from misdemeanor child neglect
charges, did not provide the parent-defendant with a defense to involuntary manslaughter and felony child endangerment charges.' 4 The
Walker Court further found that the defendant's prosecution did not
run afoul of either the Free Exercise Clause or the Due Process
Clause. 15 In contrast, the Florida Supreme Court's recent decision in
Hermanson v. State held that parents should not be prosecuted on
criminal charges resulting from reliance on the statutory exemption for
spiritual healing contained in child abuse statutes.'
A.

Walker v. Superior Court
1.

The Facts

Four-year-old Shauntay Walker fell ill with flu-like symptoms on
February 21, 1984. Her mother, Laurie Grouard Walker, was a member
of the Church of Christ, Scientist. Consistent with the tenets of her
religion, Walker, the defendant in this case, chose to treat Shauntay's
illness with prayer instead of seeking medical care. I" Walker also contacted both an accredited Christian Science prayer practitioner who
prayed for Shauntay and a Christian Science nurse who attended
Shauntay on three different occasions during her illness. Despite these
measures, Shauntay lost weight and grew increasingly disoriented and
irritable during the week before her death. After seventeen days of illness, during which time she received no medical care, the child lapsed
into a period of heavy and irregular breathing and finally died of acute
purulent meningitis.' 8
The State charged the defendant with involuntary manslaughter
and felony child endangerment for criminal negligence proximately
causing Shauntay's death. The court denied the defendant's motion to
dismiss the prosecution's case, in which she argued that her conduct
14. 763 P.2d 852 (Cal. 1988).
15. Id. The court analyzed the prosecution under the Free Exercise and Due Process Clauses
found in both the California Constitution and the United States Constitution.
16. 604 So.2d 775 (Fla. 1992). Although the Hermansons were actually prosecuted for the
death of their child, the Hermanson Court contended that the parents were only prosecuted for
their reliance on the spiritual accommodation statute.
17. Walker, 763 P.2d at 855. The court in Walker noted that "[m]embers of the Church
'believe that disease is a physical manifestation of errors of the mind.'" Id. at 855 n.1. (quoting
Catherine W. Laughran, Religious Beliefs and the Criminal Justice System: Some Problemsof the
FaithHealer, 8 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 396, 397 n.7 (1975)). However, "if some turn in what they think
is an urgent time of need to medical treatment for themselves or their children, they are
not-contrary to some recent charges-stigmatized by their church." Id. (quoting Talbot, The Position of the Christian Science Church, 26 N. Eng. Med. J. 1641, 1642 (1983)).
18. Walker, 763 P.2d at 855. An autopsy revealed that the child had suffered from meningitis
for at least two to three weeks. Walker v. Superior Court, 222 Cal. Rptr. 87, 88 (Cal. Ct. App.
1986).
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was specifically protected by law and that the statutes utilized in her
conviction failed to provide fair notice that her conduct was criminal.
The California Supreme Court granted the defendant's second petition
for review, in which she offered various statutory and constitutional arguments as to why her prosecution was barred as a matter of law. The
court held that Walker could be prosecuted as charged.1 9
2.

The Majority Opinion

The Walker court began its discussion by addressing the three
statutory claims presented by the defendant: (1) that Section 27020 of
the California Penal Code was a complete defense to her prosecution;
(2) that the legislature expressed an intent to exempt prayer conduct
from the reaches of Penal Code Sections 192(b)2 ' and 273a(1); 22 and (3)
that she lacked the requisite measure of culpability. 23 It then considered the defendant's claims that her conduct was absolutely protected
by free exercise clauses contained in both the state24 and federal 25 con19. All facts come from Walker, 763 P.2d at 855.
20. The original statute enacted in 1872 provided the following list of necessities to be furnished by the parent: "food, clothing, shelter, or medical attendance." In 1925, the state legislature
added the phrase "or other remedial care" after "medical attendance." Then, in 1976, the statute
was again amended to specify that "'treatment by spiritual means through prayer alone" constitutes 'other remedial'care.'"
This Section now reads in pertinent part:
If a parent of a minor child willfully omits, without lawful excuse, to furnish necessary clothing, food, shelter or medical attendance, or other remedial care for his or her child, he or she
is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by a fine ... or by imprisonment.., or both... If a
parent provides a minor with treatment by spiritual means through prayer alone in accordance with the tenets and practices of a recognized church or religious denomination, by a
duly accredited practitioner thereof, such treatment shall constitute 'other remedial care', as
used in this section.
Cal. Penal Code § 270 (West 1988).
21. Cal. Penal Code § 192(b) defines involuntary manslaughter as the "unlawful killing of a
human being without malice.., in the commission of an unlawful act, not amounting to a felony;
or in the commission of a lawful act which might produce death, in an unlawful manner, or without
due caution or circumspection."
22. This Section reads:
Any person who, under circumstances or conditions likely to produce great bodily harm or
death, willfully causes or permits any child to suffer, or inflicts thereon unjustifiable physical
pain or mental suffering, or having the care or custody of any child, willfully causes or permits
the person or health of such child to be injured, or willfully causes or permits such child to be
placed in such a situation that its person or health is endangered, is punishable by imprisonment ....
Id. § 273(a)(1).
23. This Note will not address the culpability issue.
24. Cal. Const., Art. I., § 4. Because the state provision is essentially the same as the federal
one, only the federal provision will be discussed.
25. U.S. Const., Amend. I. The amendment bars the government from prohibiting the free
exercise of religion.
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stitutions and that her due process rights26 were violated because of a
lack of notice in the statutes.
The court first addressed the threshold question of whether Section
270 permits prayer as an alternative to medical care or whether the
term "other remedial care" represents a distinct and additional necessity that a parent must furnish aside from "medical attendance." Because of the clear language utilized in the statute, the court concluded
that the legislature intended "other remedial care" to be a substitute
for "medical attendance" and held that Section 270 exempts parents
who use prayer treatment from this statutory requirement to furnish
medical care.
The court then turned to the question of whether the exemption
applies to the manslaughter and child endangerment statutes. After examining the clear language of these statutes, their respective objectives,
and their legislative histories, the court concluded that the exemption
does not apply in prosecutions under Sections 192(b) and 273a(1). 28
Specifically, the court noted that conduct which is legal in one context
may be actionable under other statutes written with different legislative
purposes. 29 The court relied on the statutory construction rule which
provides that statutes should be read together only if they are in pari
materia.30 That is, unless the statutes relate to the same person, thing,
or class thereof, or have the same purpose or object,$' they should not
be construed as having parallel constructions.3 2
In this case, Section 270 was created not to punish neglectful parents, but rather to secure financial support for children. 3 As a fiscal
policy, courts have created an insolvency exception to compliance with
this particular statute.34 However, no such exception has been recognized under Sections 273a or 192(b), both of which are protection statutes.35 Moreover, the fact that the legislature chose to amend one
26. Cal. Const., Art. 1, § 7 and U.S. Const., Amend. XIV "assure that no person shall be
deprived of 'life, liberty or property without due process of law.'" Walker, 763 P.2d at 871.
27. Id. at 858. In so holding, the court overruled dictum in People v. Arnold, 426 P.2d 515
(Cal. 1967), which stated that use of "other remedial care" did not satisfy the "medical attention"

obligation.
28. Walker, 763 P.2d at 862.
29. The court explained that "[c]onduct that is legal in one statutory context thus may be
actionable under separate statutes created for different legislative purposes." Id. at 858-59.
30. Id. at 858-59 n.4.
31. Whether two statutes have the same purposes and objects is the most important factor in
determining whether they should be construed together. Id. at 862.
32. Id.

33. Id. at 859.
34. Id.
35.

Id.
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statute to include a religious accommodation while not amending others
demonstrates an intent to leave the law as it stands."6
The defendant also contended that the California legislature implicitly intended to exempt prayer treatment from the consequences of
Sections 192(b) and 273a(1). The defendant's argument was based on a
criminal liability exemption for the substitution of prayer for medical
attention present in several statutes.3 The court found, however, that
none of these statutes with accommodation exemptions indicated a legislative intent to sanction prayer in the case of a child in "life-threatening circumstances." 38 Moreover, after examining the legislative histories
and applying the rules of statutory construction to three specific abuse
and neglect statutes 9 which provide that "children receiving treatment
by prayer shall not 'for that reason alone' be considered abused or neglected for its purposes," the court found that the legislature intended
prayer treatment to be accommodated as a means of attending to the
needs of a child only when there is no risk of serious physical harm.4 0
The court based its reasoning on a dependency and neglect case
decided by the Supreme Court of Colorado, People in the Interest of
D.L.E.41 In D.L.E., the court found that parents' use of prayer treatment in lieu of medical treatment when their child is in
a life threaten4'
ing situation is enough to trigger a finding of neglect.

The defendant's first constitutional claim rested on the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and the analogous provision in the
state constitution. In addressing this claim, the court relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Cantwell v. Connecticut, which held that
states may regulate religiously motivated conduct.43 In determining
whether this particular government restriction on conduct violated the
defendant's First Amendment rights, the court balanced the importance
of the state's interest against the severity of the religious infringe36. Id. at 862.
37. Since the legislature created the exemption in the first instance, it surely knew how to
create such an exemption in other, statutes. By not providing for accommodation in these other
cases, it seems the legislature was choosing specifically to provide no such defense in these other
situations.
38. Id. at 863. Many of the statutes cited deal with exemptions for medical licensing of
prayer practitioners and their facilities and the accommodation for an individual to rely on prayer
for his own care. Id. at 863 n.9, n.10. Obviously, the legislature would be motivated by different
concerns in these cases.
39. Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code §§ 16500 and 18950 (West 1991); Cal. Penal Code § 11164 et seq.
(West 1992).
40. Walker, 763 P.2d at 863-66.
41. 645 P.2d 271 (Colo. 1982).
42. Id. at 274-75.
43. Walker, 763 P.2d at 869. See also Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 296.
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ment."I In addition, the court recognized that the regulation has to be
the least restrictive alternative to advance adequately the state's
45
interest.
After analyzing the factors in the balancing test, the Walker court
concluded that no matter how severe the religious imposition, the gov46
ernmental interest is clearly sufficient to justify any restrictive effect.

Moreover, the court rejected the defendant's claim that a civil dependency proceeding would advance the state interest in a less intrusive
manner reasoning that it is unclear that parents would prefer to lose
custody of their children rather than face criminal liability. Further,
such a proceeding would not necessarily be effective since the state
often does not learn of a child's illness until the child's death.47
The defendant's final defense to her prosecution was based on the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the corresponding provision in the California Constitution. As stated previously, due
process requires that a state give its citizens fair notice of what constitutes criminal conduct.48 The court examined the two components of

this requirement. Specifically, that the statute must be definite enough
to provide: (1) a standard of conduct for proscribed activities and (2) a
standard for police enforcement and guilt determination.49
The court summarily dismissed the claim that the statute did not
provide adequate standards for police enforcement and guilt determination.50 However, the court discussed the first requirement more extensively. The defendant initially contended that Sections 192(b) and
273a(1) do not clearly establish at what point in a child's illness a parent's religious treatment becomes criminal.5 The court stated that
there are many instances in which the law requires a person to estimate
44.

The Supreme Court set forth this test in Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406, and Wisconsin v.

Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972).
45. Walker, 763 P.2d at 869 (citing Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana Employment Security

Div., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981)). This is the same requirement the Supreme Court imposed in Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406.
46. Walker, 763 P.2d at 870. In reaching this conclusion, the court relied on the frequently
quoted statement made by the Supreme Court in Prince, 321 U.S. at 170: "Parents may be free to
become martyrs themselves. But it does not follow they are free, in identical circumstances, to
make martyrs of their children before they have reached the age of full legal discretion when they
can make that choice for themselves." Walker, 763 P.2d at 870. Additionally, the court noted that
"'[t]he right to practice religion freely does not include liberty to expose the community or child
to communicable disease or the latter to ill health or death."' Id. (quoting Yoder, 406 U.S. at 23334).

47.

Walker, 763 P.2d at 870-71.

48. Id. at 871. See notes 10-14 and accompanying text for a discussion of the notice
requirement.
49. Id. (quoting Burg, 673 P.2d at 732).
50. Walker, 763 P.2d at 872.

51. Id. at 871-72.
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correctly regarding his conduct 52, and that the law required no more in
terms of notice.5 3 The defendant also argued that the statute violated
her right to fair notice because the same conduct accommodated in Section 270 is criminally punished in Sections 192(a) and 273a(1). 5 The
court rejected this contention as well as a matter of law. 5
B. Hermanson v. State
1. The Facts
On or about September 25, 1986, William F. and Christine
Hermanson noticed that there was something wrong with their daughter, Amy. They believed her symptoms were a physical manifestation of
an emotional illness. As members of the First Church of Christ Scientist, they called a duly-accredited practitioner of their church for consultation and treatment in accordance with their religious beliefs. The
practitioner administered prayer treatment until September 30. On
September 29, they noticed that Amy's condition had worsened and
called another practitioner for additional spiritual treatment. That day,
Mr. Hermanson had a discussion with his father-in-law who suggested
that Amy might have diabetes.5 6 On September 30, the Hermansons secured the services of a Christian Science nurse.57 That same day, a
counselor from the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services
'called and informed Mr. Hermanson that the Department had received
a complaint alleging child abuse and that a hearing was set for that
afternoon to determine, among other things, whether medical treatment
should be ordered for Amy. While at the courthouse, Mr. Hermanson
received notice that Amy's condition had worsened and that someone
52. Id. at 872. The Court quoted Justice Holmes:
[T]he law is full of instances where a man's fate depends on his estimating rightly, that is, as
the jury subsequently estimates it, some matter of degree .... ' An act causing death may be
murder, manslaughter, or misadventure according to the degree of danger attending it' by
common experience in the circumstances known to the actor.
Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373, 377 (1913).
53. That is, all laws proscribing certain conduct necessarily require a person (usually the
reasonable person) to determine whether his or her actions cross the threshold of legal behavior.
Laws that require such a determination provide adequate notice to society that certain behaviors
will not be tolerated. See Walker, 763 P.2d at 872.

54. Id.
55. Id. The court requires its citizens to appraise themselves of not only statutory language
but also of judicial construction and legislative purpose. Id. Given the previously stated differing
objectives in the statutes, it cannot be said that the defendant was subjected to "inexplicably
contradictory commands." Id. at 872-73.
56. While there is no evidence in the case that Mr. Hermanson's father-in-law was an expert
on diabetes, the conversation tends to demonstrate that a reasonable person would recognize Amy
had a serious illness.
57. The case does not detail the specific nature of the care given by the Christian Science
nurse.
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had called an ambulance. Amy died at 1:27 p.m. on September 30 from
diabetic ketoacidosis due to juvenile-onset diabetes mellitus. Expert
testimony presented at trial indicated 58
that death most likely could have
been avoided with medical treatment.
William and Christine Hermanson were convicted of felony child
abuse resulting in third degree murder. They sought a reversal of their
convictions in the district court of appeals. The Hermansons claimed
that: (1) they had a statutory affirmative defense to, or exemption from,
liability; (2) the free exercise and due process clauses of the federal and
state constitutions prohibited their convictions; and (3) their motion to
dismiss should have been granted because they did not possess the required degree of culpability.5 9 The appellate court affirmed the trial
court's sentence and certified the issue of whether the spiritual treatment clause found in one section of the Florida Statutes provides a
statutory defense to a criminal action brought under Florida's child
abuse statute.60 The state supreme court found that a violation of due
process had occurred and accordingly quashed the court of appeals'
decision. 1
2.

The Holding

Though the Hermansons challenged the court of appeals' decision
on four grounds, the Florida Supreme Court found that the due process
claim was dispositive and declined to comment on the others.62 After
explicitly rejecting the Walker court's analysis,"3 the court found that
in essence, when construed together, Florida Statutes Sections
827.04(1)64 and 415.503(9)(f) e5 are ambiguous and deny due process be58. Specifically, the expert stated that death could have been avoided "to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, by medical treatment up to shortly before her death." Hermanson v.
State, 570 So.2d 322, 325-27 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
59. All facts come from id. at 324-27.
60. Hermanson v. State, 604 So.2d 775, 775 (Fla. 1992).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 780.
63. The court also rejected the approaches taken by courts in Pennsylvania and Indiana
which are similar to the Walker decision. Id. at 781-82. See Pennsylvania v. Barnhart, 497 A.2d
616 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985); Hall v. State, 493 N.E.2d 433 (Ind. 1986).
64. This child abuse statute reads in pertinent part:
(1) Whoever, willfully or by culpable negligence, deprives a child of, or allows a child to be
deprived of, necessary food, clothing, shelter, or medical treatment, or who, knowingly or by
culpable negligence, inflicts or permits the infliction of physical or mental injury to the child,
and in so doing causes great bodily harm, permanent disability, or permanent disfigurement
to such child, shall be guilty of a felony of the third degree.
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 827.04(1) (West 1992).
Section 782.04(4), the third degree murder statute, provides that the "killing of a human being," while engaged in the commission of child abuse, "is murder in the third degree." Fla. Stat.
Ann. § 782.04(4) (West Supp. 1992).
65. Section 415.503, a section containing definitions to Sections 415.502 to 415.514, reads in
pertinent part:
(1) 'Abused or neglected child' means a child whose physical or mental health or welfare is
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cause they fail to give notice as to the point in time at which a parent's
reliance on spiritual treatment moves into the realm of culpable negligence. 6 Specifically, the court found that this ambiguity created a
"trap" for the ordinary person. In reaching its conclusion, the court relied on one of its prior holdings where it found that a violation occurs
when one of ordinary intelligence cannot discern what activity is
6 7
proscribed.
In addition, the court based its decision on the due process discussion in the Minnesota case of State v. McKown.6 5 In McKown, the two
statutes implicated were a child neglect statute containing a spiritual
exemption and a manslaughter statute that did not contain such an exemption. 9 The McKown court found that the statutes should not be
harmed, or threatened with harm, by the acts or omissions of the parent... (9) (formerly3
subsection 7) 'Harm' to a child's health or welfare can occur when the parent... (f) [flails to
supply the child with adequate food, clothing, shelter, or health care, although financially able
to do so or although offered financial or other means to do so; however, a parent... responsible for the child's welfare legitimately practicing his religious beliefs, who by reason thereof
does not provide specified medical treatment for a child, may not be considered abusive or
neglectful for that reason alone, but such an exception does not: 3. [p]reclude a court from
ordering, when the health of the child requires it, the provision of medical services by a physician ...
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 415.503(9)(f) (West Supp. 1992).
The accommodation language was initially passed in 1975 as Section 827.07(4). The Senate
staff analysis stated that "these provisions were 'a defense for parents who decline medical treatment for legitimate religious reasons.'" Hermanson, 604 S.2d at 776.
66. Id. at 775. The court explicitly stated that "a person of ordinary intelligence cannot be
expected to understand the extent to which reliance on spiritual healing is permitted and the point
at which this reliance constitutes a criminal offense ... The statutes have created a trap that the
legislature should address." Id. at 776.
67. The court stated that there is a violation of due process when a man of common intelligence cannot discern what activity the statute proscribes. Hermanson, 604 So.2d at 782 (noting
Linville v. State, 359 So.2d 450, 453-54 (Fla. 1978)).
68. 475 N.W.2d 63 (Minn. 1991). The facts in McKown are similar to those in Walker and
Hermanson. The parents were indicted for second-degree manslaughter after their eleven-year-old
child died of diabetic ketoacidosis; the parents were Christian Scientists and used spiritual means
alone to treat their child's illness. Id.
69. Minn. Stat. § 609.378 (1992) reads in pertinent part:
Subdivision 1 .... The following people are guilty of neglect or endangerment of a child and
may be sentenced to imprisonment... or to payment of a fine ...

or both.... (a) ...

A

parent... who willfully deprives a child of necessary food, clothing, shelter, health care...
when the parent.., is reasonably able to make the necessary provisions and the deprivation
substantially harms the child's physical or emotional health.., is guilty of neglect.... If a
parent.., in good faith selects and depends upon spiritual means or prayer for treatment...
this treatment or care is 'health care,' for purposes of this clause (a).
Minn. Stat. § 609.205 (1992) reads in pertinent part:
A person who causes the death of another by any of the following means is guilty of manslaughter in the second degree and may be sentenced to imprisonment... or to payment of a
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construed together to allow the spiritual treatment exemption defense
in a manslaughter charge since they are not ambiguously worded so as
to invoke the need for further interpretive tools and that the statutes
are not in pari materia because they relate to different purposes.70 The
McKown court found the child neglect statute violated due process because it did not inform the defendants that if their chosen method of
treatment failed, they could face criminal charges beyond that provided
for in the neglect statute.7 1 Accordingly, the defendant was not

convicted.
IV.

ANALYSIS OF THE CASES AND THEIR RAMIFICATIONS

A.

ConstitutionalArguments
1.

Free Exercise

Clearly, the state may interfere with its citizens' constitutional
rights if it has a compelling interest in doing so.7 2 Rarely does anyone
challenge convictions in these cases by asserting that the welfare and
protection of children is not compelling. Rather, scholars tend to challenge these convictions by arguing that (1) the belief-conduct distinction is merely rhetorical, thereby creating punishment of belief as
opposed to conduct;7 3 (2) the decisions in cases like Walker do not profine.., or both: (1) by the person's culpable negligence whereby the person creates an unreasonable risk, and consciously takes chances causing death or great bodily harm to another....
70. McKown, 475 N.W.2d at 66.
71. Id. at 68-69. The court in this case specifically noted that the precise due process issue at
hand was distinguishable from that discussed in Walker and the Hermanson case as decided at the
Court of Appeals level. Id. at 67 & n.7. Essentially, the court found that the issue it confronted was
unique because the question was not whether the language used in a particular statute was sufficient to provide fair notice, but rather whether the statute went far enough in stating what penalties could be imposed by virtue of another statute. Id. at 67. The court noted that the language
allowing spiritual treatment was broad and did not provide a point in time when such conduct
could become criminal. Id. at 68. Yet, the court concluded by stating that it neither held that
conduct complying with one statute necessarily complies with all others absent explicit notice to
the contrary nor that the state could never prosecute one whose reliance on spiritual healing resulted in a child's death. Id. The court asserted that its holding was limited to this particular
instance when the state has expressed clearly its intention to permit prayer in lieu of medical
treatment. Id. at 68-69.
The dissent in the case found that the majority's holding was nothing but the in pari materia
argument "garbed in the cloak of due process." Id. at 71. It further found that any mistake on the
part of the defendants was one of law, which is not a defense to prosecution. Id.
72. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406.
73. See Edward Egan Smith, The Criminalizationof Belief: When Free Exercise Isn't, 42
Hastings L. J. 1491 (1991).
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tect children;7 4 and
(3) there are less restrictive means of advancing the
75
state's interests.
One author has argued that because conduct becomes criminal only
at the point that a reasonable person would have sought medical attention, the state is punishing parents for their beliefs and not their conduct. That is, this standard focuses on what a reasonable person
believes about spiritual healing, thereby restricting what a particular
religious adherent is free to believe. 6 The author has asserted that the
distinction between absolutely protected religious belief and regulated
conduct based on religious belief is, therefore, purely rhetorical and
therefore creates a violation of the First Amendment when parents are
convicted on criminal charges based on the spiritual treatment of their
77
children.

Although the purpose of the Free Exercise Clause is to protect minority religions from the will of the majority, the Supreme Court has
stated that there is such a distinction between "absolutely protected
religious beliefs" and "religiously motivated conduct. 1

8

In the cases

previously discussed, the issue is not whether the parents are free to
believe that spiritual healing will cure their children, but rather
whether by refusing to seek medical attention for their children they
are engaging in unprotected religiously motivated conduct. Thus, although a parent may believe that his or her child will recover from an
illness with spiritual treatment alone, because she objectively knows
when a child needs medical attention, he or she should be held accountable for failing to act in accordance with a state imposed obligation.7 9
Even conceding that the belief-conduct distinction is purely rhetorical, such a distinction must exist to prevent chaos in society. A civilized society simply cannot exist if everyone is allowed to disregard the
law to the detriment of others simply because he or she believes their
religion demands the commission of an unlawful act.80

The argument that Walker type cases do not protect children is
also problematic because it does not consider the various goals of crimi74. Elizabeth R. Koller, Walker v. Superior Court: Religious Convictions May Bring Felony
Convictions, 21 Pac. L.J. 1069 (July 1990).
75. Id. at 1069; Christine A. Clark, Religious Accommodation and Criminal Liability, 17 Fla.
St. L. Rev. 559 (1990).
76. Smith, 42 Hastings L. J. at 1491 (cited in note 73).
77. Id.
78. See notes 3-4 and accompanying text.
79. Parents who use spiritual treatment do not live in a vacuum, and therefore probably do
recognize the point in time at which most people would seek medical attention for their children.
See note 17 (stating that Christian Scientists may, in an "urgent time of need" utilize medical
treatment).
80. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 884-85.
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nal law.8 1 While it may be true that one who has personally seen a religious healing, or perhaps has even received successful spiritual
treatment, likely will not pay heed to criminal sanctions at first, it does
not follow that protection of children is not enhanced. First, in terms of
specific deterrence, if parents are actually imprisoned for the death of
one child, it seems likely they would not proceed along the same course
with their other children. Second, punishing these parents accomplishes
the goal of general deterrence. Parents are thereby forced to acknowledge not only the existence of such laws, but also the fact that ordinary
people are subject to them and may be prosecuted for violations to the
fullest extent. This awareness may inhibit one from committing the
same crime. For example, if a fellow church member is punished for
permitting a child to die by withholding medical attention, a parent will
be more likely to obey the law.
Finally, scholars have argued that criminal prosecution is not the
least restrictive means for advancing the state's interest in child protection. One author has asserted that losing temporary custody of a child
2
is less severe, from the family's standpoint, than criminal prosecution.
This may not be an effective alternative, however, since the authorities
may not learn of an illness until the child's death. One response to this
rebuttal is that modern reporting statutes alert authorities to potentially dangerous situations in time to prevent children's deaths.8 3 Yet,
the child in Hermanson died while the father was actually at the custody hearing. 4 Thus, in at least some cases, reporting statutes and dependency hearings are not effective in preventing harm to a child since
the child may die before the judge can order medical care.
The Supreme Court has held that states may regulate religious
conduct if they have a compelling interest in doing so. It appears that
the safety and welfare of society's children cannot be effectively protected unless states are able to do so. To find otherwise would be to
sentence children, as well as other members of society, to serious bodily
injury or death whenever one's religious beliefs call for harm to others.
For example, if religiously motivated conduct could not be regulated by
the state, then one whose religion calls for human sacrifice would be
81. One of the principal reasons for criminal punishment is deterrence. This deterrence can
be specific, meaning that punishment serves to keep one from repeating a crime. The deterrence,
however, can also be general. In general deterrence, society at large is warned against committing a
crime.
82. Clark, 17 Fla. St. L. Rev. at 559.
83. See, for example, Daniel J. Kearney, Parental Failure to Provide Child With Medical
Assistance Based On Religious Beliefs Causing Child's Death, 90 Dick. L. Rev. 861, 885 (1986)
(arguing that state ordered care is an effective alternative).
84. Hermanson, 604 So.2d at 778.
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free to kill whomever he or she wished in the name of freedom of
religion.8 5
2.

Due Process

The alleged problem with notice in Walker and Hermanson is that
individuals supposedly cannot ascertain at which point their conduct
becomes criminally culpable. This is different from the traditional
problem of fair warning in that the question is not whether the behavior at issue is illegal, but rather at which point, and why, the behavior
ceases to be legal. Graphically, one can imagine this problem on a continuum with completely legal conduct on one end and completely illegal
conduct on the other. The question is, therefore, where on the continuum does the characterization of the behavior change and how can one
recognize that point?
First, note that while the Hermanson court relied on the Minnesota court's reasoning in McKown, the issues in these two cases were
actually completely different.86 The issue in McKown was whether the
neglect statute at issue went far enough in that it failed to provide that
compliance with the statute did not insulate an individual from prosecution under other statutes. 7 In fact, the McKown Court explicitly
stated that the issue was different than the one considered in Walker
and Hermanson at the Court of Appeals level. 8 Moreover, the McKown
Court conceded that the two statutes implicated should not have been
read together because they were not in pari materia.89 Since the finding
by the state Supreme Court in Hermanson was actually based on the
premise that the two statutes, when considered together,9 0 violated due
process, there is no support in McKown for the Hermanson decision.9 1
85. Note that some accommodation statutes recognize beliefs of only Christian Scientists or
other established and recognized mainstream religions. However, these statutes present serious
problems in terms of the Establishment Clause and the Equal Protection Clause. For a legislature
or court to decide which religions are legitimized by society would surely violate the excessive
entanglement prohibition and various other constitutional provisions. For a further analysis, see
State v. Miskimens, 490 N.E.2d 931 (1984); Paula A. Monopoli, Allocating the Cost of Parental
Free Exercise, 18 Pepp. L. Rev. 319 (1991); Christine A. Semanson, Walker v. Superior Court: A
Question of Faith?, 1989 Det. Coll. L. Rev. 263 (1989).

86. 475 N.W.2d at 67. See also note 71 and accompanying text.
87. 475 N.W.2d at 67.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Hermanson, 604 So.2d at 775.
91. Recall the dissent in McKown. There, Justice Coyne noted that the due process argument as framed in the case was really just an in pari materia argument cloaked in due process
language. 475 N.W.2d at 69. Thus, any mistake regarding the proscribed conduct contained in the
statute is one of law, which is not a legally recognized defense. Id. at 71.
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One issue presented in Walker and Hermanson regards the point
in time at which one's previously lawful conduct becomes criminal. The
court in Hermaon concluded that the state trapped the Hermansons
by declaring certain conduct legal in one context but illegal in another
without fair warning.9 2 There are two crucial elements of this conclusion: (1) whether fair warning was given and (2) whether the statute
should be characterized as a trap.
Since the court in Hermanson ruled that an objective criteria for
determining due process violations of this sort was proper,9" one must
examine what impression a reasonable person would gather from the
statute's language. The statute in Hermanson clearly provides that the
definitions contained therein are to be used with a set of particular statutes only-a set that does not include the statute related to third degree murder. Furthermore, the subsection containing the spiritual
treatment exemption expressly states that such accommodation does
not preclude authorities from intervening and ordering medical care on
the child's behalf.9 4 Thus, it is not reasonable to conclude that the exemption applies to create total immunity in all cases related to spiritual
healing. Obviously, the state did not intend to remove itself completely
from the realm of spiritual treatment. Therefore, a parent's knowledge
of a spiritual accommodation statute does not excuse his or her ignorance regarding an applicable murder or manslaughter statute. Courts
generally construe this ignorance as a mistake of governing law, a mistake which is not normally considered a legal defense to criminal
prosecution. 5
Additionally, the Hermanson Court misinterpreted the real issue in
its characterization of the trap. The court stated that the trap resulted
from the fact that conduct in one context was legal while the same conduct in another context was illegal. This characterization must be inaccurate because there are several instances in which context determines
illegality.9 6 The real issue is determining when the line is crossed.
The Hermanson court contended that because the statute is too
ambiguous to provide adequate notice of when one's behavior becomes
92.

Hermanson, 604 So.2d at 782 (quoting Clark, 17 Fla. St. L. Rev. at 585 (cited in note

75)).
93. The appropriate inquiry is whether a person of common intelligence would know that
certain conduct is proscribed. Hermanson, 604 So.2d at 775.
94. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 415.503 (Supp. 1992). See note 65 for exact language.
95. For further explanation on mistakes of governing law, see John Kaplan and Robert Weisberg, Criminal Law: Cases and Materials at 139-74 (Little, Brown, 2d ed. 1991).
96. For example, one is free to walk throughout his home nude but walking in the nude
outside of the home would violate an obscenity law. Similarly, it is not illegal to be intoxicated if
one is over the legal drinking age; yet, driving an automobile while intoxicated would violate the
law.
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illegal, one can only avoid prosecution by guessing correctly about the
legality of one's actions." Yet, as the Walker Court articulated, the law
regularly requires this type of determination. All members of society
must estimate when their behavior ceases to be legal-the law forces
people to guess, as a matter of degree, where the line between legal and
illegal behavior is crossed.9 8 Thus, there comes a point at which parents
have a duty to seek care for their child to ensure the child's well-being.
This point must be estimated as the point when a reasonable person
would realize the gravity of the situation and call for medical assistance-usually at a point before the occurrence of great bodily harm or
death.
While the Hermanson court expressly rejected this approach, it is
undeniable that this is exactly how the law customarily operates. An
example of having to guess rightly can be seen in the concept of rape.
On one end of the continuum is consensual sex. On the other end is
rape. Supposedly, the transformation between consensual sex and the
illegal act of rape occurs whenever the victim states or shows an unwillingness to proceed with the act. In reality, however, the point where
"no means no" has become blurred. An individual making sexual advances must decide when the other party is actually consenting. If he
fails to ascertain unwillingness, he is guilty of a crime. Rarely would one
expect a rapist to challenge his prosecution by claiming that although
he knows that rape is a crime his right to due process has been violated
because the state mandated that he guess correctly in determining
whether the other party had consented.
With regard to the mandate that a law cannot issue contradictory
commands and satisfy the due process requirement, again, the statute is
dealing with a continuum and not two opposites. The law does not provide both that one must use spiritual healing and that one must not use
spiritual healing. Rather, it says that one may use spiritual healing in
certain circumstances, as defined, but not in other circumstances.
As to the question of why, at a certain point in time, the state is
willing to interfere with familial relations, the answer is straightforward. The line is drawn at the point at which great bodily harm or
death will result to a child. The state has a very real interest in protecting its children, although it refrains from intervening until absolutely
necessary in order to preserve the sanctity of the family.
97. Hermanson, 604 So.2d at 782.
98. "[T]he law is full of instances where a man's fate depends on his estimating rightly, that
is, as the jury subsequently estimates it, some matter of degree.... ." Walker, 763 P.2d at 872.
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If ignorance of the law is, indeed, no excuse, then courts must prosecute parents who permit their children to die needlessly 9 Parents
have constructive notice of murder laws. They also have no reasonable
right to believe that the state has completely recused itself from spiritual healing matters simply because one statute within a code contains
a narrow exception pertaining only to a particular statute or statutes.
Furthermore, just because a statute does not define an exact time when
conduct becomes unreasonable, that does not make the statute unconstitutional. Again, we all must choose different degrees of behavior
every day, and if our decisions are incorrect, we may be held
accountable.
B.

Statutory Construction

While the court in Hermanson made explicit reference to construing the statutes together, it did not address any statutory construction
issues. This is a serious error because the two statutes should not be
considered together in determining whether due process is violated unless they stand in pari materia. Before one can decide whether the two
statutes together create a trap, one must show that they should be read
together in the first place.
The two statutes at issue in Hermanson should not be construed
together for three reasons: (1) neither is ambiguous so as to trigger the
need to construe them together; (2) the accommodation statute expressly defines its own limits;10 0 and (3) the purposes behind the two
statutes are different.
First, the McKown court stated that the doctrine of in pari materia
is simply an interpretive tool to be used in determining the meaning of
ambiguously worded statutes."0 1 Neither statute in Hermanson is ambiguous. Indeed, the Hermanson court only found ambiguity after it
construed the statutes together.10 2 If the court had adhered to the principle of in pari materia, it would have never found any ambiguity.
Second, the spiritual accommodation provision sets its own limits.
It is contained in a section of definitions related to a specifically listed
group of laws.10 3 After the Florida legislature renumbered former Sec99. The causation argument presented by some defendants is not discussed in this Note.
100. The reasoning utilized in this section applies to any claim of total immunity arising
from Section 415.511. For support of such a total immunity claim, see Clark, 17 Fla. St. L. Rev. at
559 (cited in note 75).
101. McKown, 475 N.W.2d at 67.
102. Hermanson, 604 So.2d at 775.
103. "415.503. Definition of terms used in § § 415.502 to 415.514." Fla. Stat. Ann. § 415.503
(West Supp. 1992) (emphasis added).
For support of this type of limitation on the applicability of a statute, see Semanson, 1989
Det. Coll. L. Rev. at 263 (cited at note 85) (focusing on the phrase "as used in this section").
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tion 827.07(2), now codified at Sections 415.502 to 415.514, it chose not
to extend the use of the definitions in Section 415.503 to any other section of the law. Even as previously enacted, the spiritual treatment language of Section 827.07(2) was limited to the reporting and
investigating of child abuse and did not form part of the felony child
abuse statute contained in Section 827.04(1).10" Therefore, it seems contradictory to both legislative intent and common sense to construe the
two statutes together.
Finally, as was the case in Walker, the two Florida statutes have
very different purposes and should, therefore, not be construed in pari
materia. The Florida Court of Appeals in Hermanson properly analyzed
the purposes of each statute. 10 The appellate court found that Section
415.503, a definitions section, is part of a comprehensive scheme enacted to provide protective services to children. 10 6 The legislative intent
of this scheme is contained in Section 415.502,107 which essentially demonstrates that the statutes have the limited purpose of providing a reporting and investigation mechanism for the prevention of child
abuse. 0 8
The appellate court went further to establish the legislative intent
before concluding that the statutes should not be construed together. It
first noted that when a death occurs, the scheme has failed since its
purpose is the prevention of harm. Action by other state agencies is
then triggered. 10 9 Moreover, the scheme's administrative aspect is apparent because it does not provide for criminal penalties for actual
104. Hermanson, 570 So.2d at 330.
105. Id. at 328-31.
106. See Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 415.502-415.514 (West Supp. 1992).
107. This section reads:
The intent of §§ 415.502-415.514 is to provide for comprehensive protective services for
abused or neglected children found in the state by requiring that reports of each abused or
neglected child be made to the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services in an effort
to prevent further harm to the child or any other children living in the home and to preserve
the family life of the parents and children, to the maximum extent possible, by enhancing the
parental capacity for adequate child care.
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 415.502 (West 1992).
108. The statutes merely provide a "mechanism for reporting suspected child abuse or neglect so that this may be investigated and stopped if substantiated .... The focus of the entire
chapter is on the reporting, investigation and prevention of child abuse." Hermanson, 570 So.2d at
329.
109. Id. Section 415.504(3) provides that "[a]ny person required to report or investigate cases
of suspected child abuse or neglect who has reasonable cause to suspect that a child died as a
result of child abuse or neglect shall report his suspicion to the appropriate medical examiner...."
The examiner then "make[s] his own investigation and report[s] to the state attorney, local law
enforcement, and HRS [Dept. of Health and Rehabilitative Services]." Hermanson, 570 So.2d at
329. The court noted that these different responsibilities are necessary since the directives contained within the scheme do not provide for a means of handling death. Hermanson, 570 So.2d at
329.
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child abuse or neglect; instead, criminal penalties for abuse and neglect
are contained in Sections 782 and 827.110 The only criminal penalties
included in the scheme are contained in Section 415.513, which provides for misdemeanor liability for failure to report or for divulging
confidential information."' Thus, it is clear that Sections 415.502 to
415.514 only direct that for purposes of reporting and investigating,
parents who fail to provide their children with medical treatment because of religious beliefs will not be found guilty of child abuse or neglect for that reason alone." 2 Any other construction would render the
laws of murder and manslaughter meaningless in a great many cases
and would fail in protecting the state's interest in regulating child
welfare.
V.

CONCLUSION

The United States Supreme Court should agree to hear any appeal
regarding the issue of religious accommodation statutes so that it can
revitalize its previous holdings in this area. On more than one occasion,
the Court has ruled that religious conduct is not absolutely protected
and that society's children have a right to protection against abuse.
Furthermore, it has explicitly stated that parents cannot make religious
martyrs of their children regardless of their own personal beliefs. However, until the Court reiterates its position that states must prevent
needless harm to, or deaths of, children the state courts must consider
seriously the constitutional and statutory construction issues raised by
the California Supreme Court in Walker. In states with accommodation
statutes, courts should adopt the reasoning of the California Supreme
Court rather than that of the Florida Supreme Court and allow the
prosecution of those who insist upon endangering the welfare of
children.
By virtue of its verdict, the Florida Supreme Court in Hermanson
has undermined that state's ability to provide for the well-being of its
children. By ignoring constitutional mandates and rules of statutory
construction, the Hermanson Court has allowed the needless suffering
of children who are at the mercy of their parents' religious beliefs.
Again, the United States Supreme Court has clearly stated that religious conduct is not absolutely protected. Since it is not absolutely
protected, courts must apply the compelling interest test to the statutes
in these cases. Under the first prong of this analysis, it is well-established that the protection of children is a compelling interest justifying
110.
111.
112.

Hermanson, 570 So.2d at 329.
Id.
Id.
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state interference. It is equally clear that there is no less intrusive manner, as dictated by the second prong of the test, by which the state can
effectively regulate this parental conduct. The fact that the Hermansons' child died while the dependency hearing, the only other real alternative means of regulation, was proceeding, supports this conclusion.
In due process terms, the Florida state legislature has satisfied all
the required constitutional mandates. The religious accommodation
provision indicates that a child will not be adjudged neglected solely
because he or she is treated by spiritual means alone. The felony child
abuse and murder statutes also give notice that certain conduct will result in criminal convictions. The fact that no statute expressly defines
the exact point in time that religious treatment becomes criminal is not
fatal. Rather, our entire judicial system is built around the reasonable
person standard, under which such a person must determine daily
which and to what degree certain behaviors are criminal.
The Florida Supreme Court also has based its holding on a faulty
premise-that the two statutes at issue must be construed together. In
fact, quite the opposite is true; the statutes unequivocally should not be
read in light of one another. Neither statute is so ambiguous that it
cannot stand alone. Further, the spiritual accommodation provision
contains within itself the range for its application. Finally, the statutes
are not in pari materia because they have different purposes.
The Florida Supreme Court has ignored the sound reasoning and
analysis set forth in the Walker decision without differentiating between the cases.:" 3 Moreover, the Hermanson court relied on the McKown case even though the McKown court expressly distinguished the
due process issue it confronted from those present in both Walker and
Hermanson, at the appellate level. It appears that the Florida Supreme
Court has judicially mandated what the Florida Legislature would not.
4
Other states should not follow such a poor standard."
If other jurisdictions interpreting accommodation statutes follow
the unsound reasoning of the Hermanson court, the limits on freedom
of religiously motivated conduct set by the United States Supreme
Court will be eroded. Free exercise of religious beliefs is a critical part
of our Constitution. Yet the state must recognize a parent has no right
to cause serious bodily harm or death to his child by refusing medical
113.

While the California decision was only persuasive authority for the Hermanson court,

once the Florida'court chose to directly criticize and reject the Walker reasoning it should have
explained its reasons for doing so.
114. See West v. Pelican Management Services Corp., 782 F. Supp. 1132, 1137 (M.D. La.
1992) (stating that it is not the function of the courts to achieve that which the legislature itself
could not achieve). See also McClesky v. Zant, 111 S. Ct. 1454, 1482 (1991) (stating that the Court
did not function as a "backup legislature").
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treatment because his religion compels him to do so-although he is
free to refuse conventional treatments for himself. In essence, courts
must not interpret statutes so as to permit parents to sentence their
children to death.
Janet June Anderson*
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